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30 Nov 1981, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1982	

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

ACDA (M) (9 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 694039

13 February 1970

**SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry  
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)**

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AND 2015."

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General**

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY (AIRMOBILE)  
APO 96490

AVDAAR-T

3 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

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## Section 1 (C) Significant Organization of Unit Activities

### 1. (U) General

a. This report covers the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969. During this period the Division Artillery supported maneuver forces in 1st CAV DIV (AM) Operation Kentucky Cougar. The operation continues in effect at the end of the reporting period.

(1) Mission. The 1st CAV DIV ARTY and supporting fire units provide fire support to 1st CAV DIV (AM) maneuver forces within the division's assigned TAOI and take necessary action to enhance the GVN pacification effort, and to improve the effectiveness of all RVNAF elements.

(2) Special Mission: the 1st CAV DIV ARTY (AM) continues to act as the maneuver headquarters for AO Chief and control the defenses of the 1st CAV DIV (AM) base camp at Phouc Vinh, RVN.

b. Task Organization (see Inclosure 1).

c. Artillery moves (see Inclosure 2).

d. Commanders and Principle Staff (see Inclosure 3).

### 2. (C) Intelligence

#### a. Area of Operations

(1) War Zone "C". Enemy activity in War Zone "C" during July and up until the 12 August high point decreased sharply over the previous reporting period. The enemy was weakened due to successful interdiction of his supply routes and the destruction of his cache areas by Arc Lights and artillery.

During August and early September, the 95C Regiment, 1st NVA Division, with its sapper elements, attempted to inflict casualties on First Team forces occupying FSBs throughout War Zone "C". On 11 August, FSB Boekie recieved a mortar attack followed by a company sized attack.

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from the west and northwest. The enemy lost 17 KIA in this attack. The following night the enemy launched an indirect rocket and mortar attack, followed by a two company ground attack from the west and northwest. Fifty-four (54) enemy were KIA in this attack. On 15 August the enemy had moved east and attacked FSB Jamie, losing 12 KIA. 5 September found the enemy back in the western portion of War Zone "C", again launching an unsuccessful attack on FSB Ike, followed by another attack on 14 September, suffering 34 KIA and 1 PW.

Shortly after the 14 September attack, the enemy withdrew north toward the Cambodian border, leaving War Zone "C" void of many enemy units. The enemy appears to be sitting and waiting, observing progress of the Paris Peace Talks and the anti-war movement in the US. It is felt some enemy resupply activity continues in War Zone "C", indicating a possible high point in early November. Should it materialize, the high point will probably consist of periodic attacks by fire and ground probes.

(2) Binh Long Province. On 29 July, a Hoi Chanh from the 272nd Regiment, 9th VC Division rallied to ARVN elements. The Hoi Chanh revealed plans for an attack against An Loc and Loc Ninh, which were to be mounted by elements of the 9th VC, 7th NVA, and 1st NVA Divisions. The attacks were to occur between 5 and 15 August. This information was substantiated by verifying heavy enemy activity in the "Fish Hook" area by sensors and visual reconnaissance.

In reaction to this intelligence, a series of Arc Lights, followed by light fire team and ground unit insertions, resulted in 72 enemy KIA, 9 PWs, and 3 Hoi Chanhs, confirming the 9th VC Divisions presence in Binh Long (P).

On 12 August, the enemy launched the first phase of his fall offensive. In the early morning hours, he struck several major friendly installations. Quan Loi Base Camp was attacked by elements of the 272nd Regiment, 9th VC Division, in conjunction with the 4th Bn, N16 Armor Office COSVN. The enemy suffered 55 KIA in this action. Simultaneously, the 271st Regiment, 9th VC Division launched attacks on FSBs Sidewinder and Aspen. Suffering 110 KIAs and one PW. In other action on 12 August, elements of the 11th ACR engaged enemy elements two kilometers east of FSB Sidewinder, accounting for 85 enemy KIA.

The enemy had taken heavy casualties and was attempting to withdraw into Cambodia. On 13 August, the 11th ACR made contact with elements of the 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division west of FSB Kelly, accounting for 77 NVA KIA. The enemy sustained a total of 460 KIA during the 12-13 August highpoints.

On 6 September in the northwest portion of Binh Long Province, elements of the 209th Regiment were contacted to the southwest

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of Loc Ninh, resulting in 40 enemy KIA and 4 PWs. PWs and documents captured on 10 September identified the 165th Regiment in the general area of the 6 September contact with the 209th Regiment.

During the remainder of September, enemy activity was insignificant. Captured documents indicated the displacement of the 101D Regiment and the 272nd Regiment to War Zone "C". The remainder of forces in Binh Long Province have withdrawn to the Cambodian border and appear to be in a stand-down posture. First Team operations have eliminated the opportunity for the enemy to launch a second phase of his fall offensive.

(3) Phuoc Long Province. Enemy activity in Phuoc Long Province had been at a low level until mid-July when a Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the 5th Bn, 95th Regiment, 5th VC Division. On 8 August, another soldier identified his unit as the 3rd Bn, 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division. He added that all three regiments of the 5th VC Division (95A, 275th, 174th) were at that time located in Phuoc Long Province.

The First Team quickly reacted, relocating the 2nd and 3rd Brigades into the area, successfully interdicting the Serge's Jungle Highway and the Adams Road Complex with strategically located FSBs and a deliberate ground and air reconnaissance.

On 12 August, elements of the 275th attacked friendly units at Duc Phong and FSB Caldwell, resulting in 21 enemy KIA.

On 3 September, elements of the 3rd MSF made contact with elements of the 5th Bn, 95A Regiment, and 24th AA Bn, 5th VC Division. The enemy suffered 21 KIA in this contact. Hoi Chanh reports indicate that August Arc Lights cut deeply into the resources of the 5th VC Division, destroying the Division hospital and inflicting heavy casualties on the 174th and 275th Regiment.

In early September the 5th VC Division assumed a stand-down posture, and Hoi Chanh reports indicate Arc Lights are taking a heavy toll of the enemy. It is believed the 5th VC Division has withdrawn toward the Cambodian border and is not fully combat effective.

It is expected that the 5th VC Division will begin to refit, resupply, and retrain in late October in an attempt to regain an offensive capability. Another possibility is that the Division will move to Long Khan Province to bolster enemy strength in that area.

(4) AO Chief. During the reporting period, enemy reconnaissance elements were active. On 8 August, Ranger Team 32 contacted 5 individuals 9 kilometers SSE of Camp Gorvad, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Captured documents indicated a 12 May perimeter probe of Camp Gorvad. On the night of 11 and 12 May, movement was noted on the perimeter of Camp Gorvad, starting approximately 2350 hours. Positive sightings followed and the perimeter wire was cut in several locations by enemy sappers.

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A vigorous series of counter attacks from the perimeter followed, coupled with various fire support assets applied at points on the perimeter and locations just south of Camp Gorvad, resulting in a total of 30 enemy KIA and numerous enemy weapons captured. Effective deployment of platoon sized elements at key points throughout AO Chief, by the base defense battalion, precluded offensive operations by the enemy in the AO.

Despite the sharp increase in enemy activity in the remainder of the First Team AO during August, activity in AO Chief was highlighted only by a standoff attack against Camp Gorvad on 15 August, probably by the K33 Artillery Battalion, using 122mm rockets for the first time.

In late August, 6 PWs captured by the 1st Infantry Division SW of AO Chief, indicated that enemy morale was low and supplies were critical. This can be attributed to allied success in interdicting enemy supply routes in the area.

A PW captured by the Chon Thanh Subsector on 5 September, identified the 7th Bn, N16 Armor Office, and stated an attack on Phuoc Vinh was a future mission of the Battalion. Radar detected a sharp increase in enemy movement in AO Chief during the first week in September, and on 5 September, Camp Gorvad received 4 volleys of mixed 107mm and 122mm rockets.

On 11 September an estimated platoon of sappers attempted to penetrate the SE perimeter near Bunker 44. Four NVA were KIA in the action. On 14 September, rnu Gao District captured an individual in the area of the attempted probe who identified the 5th Bn, N16 Armor Office. He stated 25 men were involved in the attack, confirming the estimate made following the attack.

On 18 September Camp Gorvad received three 82mm rounds and on 23 September 12-107mm rounds.

Despite being greatly hampered by friendly operations, the enemy still maintains the capability to initiate infrequent harassing attacks. He can still be expected to launch small ground probes against Camp Gorvad and continue his standoff rocket and mortar attacks. Intelligence reports indicate a coming high point of enemy activity, oriented strongly on Phuoc Vinh and Camp Gorvad, between 1 and 5 November.

b. Survey. The First Team Division Artillery Survey Section continued to provide fourth-order survey data to firing elements within the Division AO. Survey control was brought to five new fire support bases and numerous FSBs had survey data updated during the reporting period. In addition, the Div Arty Survey Section calibrated nine firing batteries and provided an "on call" crater analysis/shell rep team, which responded quickly to

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incoming attacks. This resulted in the placing of timely and accurate artillery fire on known and suspected enemy launching sites.

### c. Radar

(1) HHB, Div Arty and each of the three DS Artillery Battalions operated an AN/MPQ-4A Counter-Mortar Radar. In addition to its counter-mortar role, the Q-4 proved to be a economical and time-saving means of conducting artillery registrations.

(2) Div Arty's two AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radars showed themselves to be valuable target acquisition devices. The two radars acquired a total of 372 hostile targets during the reporting period. Their use in conjunction with Nighthawk, IR, SLAR, and sensor devices proved to be not only a means of rapid and accurate target detection, but was a reliable method of verifying intelligence information.

(3) Div Arty was also responsible for the management and control of the Division's 17 AN/TPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radars. Radars were picked up from base support bases as repairs or evacuation were needed. The sets were sent to 147th Maintenance for repair and new sets immediately returned to the FSBs. Missions were flown on a 24 hour basis, often during hours of darkness, providing the First Team's FSBs continual radar coverage.

### 3. (C) Operations

a. Plans: During the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969, the 1st CAV DIV (A1) participated in Operation Kentucky Cougar.

b. Operation Kentucky Cougar: 181930 June 69 to present.

(1) Concept of Operations: Direct support artillery was provided on a maneuver battalion - artillery battery basis, with batteries changing OPCON from their parent battalions as the brigade task organization changed. Medium artillery organic to the division was used in a General Support Reinforcing role to weigh critical areas and influence the battle. Aerial Rocket Artillery was given a Modified General Support Reinforcing mission which allowed the reinforced artillery battalion to direct the employment of up to two sections of ARA Cobras under specific conditions. Heavy artillery support was requested from supporting fire units of the 23rd Arty Gp and II FFV. Artillery and automatic weapons were used for convoy and fire support base/base camp security. Artillery support was provided to USSF camps and VNAR elements.

### (2) Execution:

Organization for Combat:

2nd Bn, 19th Arty: DS 1st Bde, 1ACD

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1st Bn, 77th Arty: DS 2nd Bde, 1ACD

1st Bn, 21st Arty: DS 3rd Bde, 1ACD

1st Bn, 30th Arty: GS 1st Cav Div Arty

Sep How batteries, 11th ACR: DS 11th ACR under OPCCN  
6th Bn, 27th Arty

(5) All three brigades of the 1st ACD and the 11th ACR continued to operate in same areas in which they were reported last period. Internal boundary adjustments were made to allow for maneuver of ARVN forces of battalion and regimental size. The 1st Bde AO is generally north and northeast of Tay Ninh extending to the Cambodian border. 2nd Bde AO extends generally north to Cambodia and south to Dong Xoai from Song Be, which is center of mass. The 3rd Bde AO extends from the Cambodian border south to Chi Linh along the Song Be River and includes Quan Loi. The 11th ACR area of operations extends south from the Cambodian border to vicinity of Chon Than along Highway QL13 and includes Loc Ninh and An Loc. It is bordered on the west by Cambodia down to the tip of the Fish Hook area. DIV ARTY conducts ground operations in AO Chief which is an area varying in radius of 10 to 20 km centered around Phouc Vinh.

c. Activity throughout the 1st CAV DIV area of operations was moderate to heavy during August and lighter during September and October. In August, the enemy's offensive efforts focused on Binh Long Province and the population centers of Loc Ninh, An Loc, and Quan Loi, each of which is also a major military installation. Coordinated attacks were carried out against other locations but the principle effort was against US/ARVN installations in Binh Long Province. Division Artillery units supported US/ARVN forces as they successfully countered all enemy attacks, handing the enemy a tremendous defeat in the Binh Long Province. Enemy activity during September and October consisted primarily of standoff attacks. 1st Cavalry Division forces conducted extensive ground reconnaissance to find and destroy the enemy, his base camps, and logistical support areas. Division Artillery made extensive use, during the reported period, of all intelligence sources to develop targets for attack.

d. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery units supported the GVN Pacification and Development Plan at every opportunity. Friendly villages were supported with artillery fire and on-call targets were planned and fired around allied settlements to insure their defense when under attack. Artillery assistance programs were conducted by DIV ARTY units which materially improved the RVNAF artillery unit's capability to support their own forces.

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e. Ammunition Expenditures (1 Aug-31 Oct) HE ONLY

UNIT	CALIBER	AMOUNT	TONNAGE
2nd Bn, 19th Arty	105MM	72,042	2,017.2
1st Bn, 77th Arty	105MM	78,667	2,202.6
1st Bn, 21st Arty	105MM	68,337	1,913.4
TOTAL (105):		<u>219,046</u>	
1st Bn, 30th Arty	155MM	35,581	1,956.9
2nd Bn, 20th Arty	2.75 FFAR	77,756	
2nd Bn, 20th Arty	7.62MM	1,238,962	
2nd Bn, 20th Arty	40MM	52,244	

f. Artillery Moves (1 Aug-31 Oct 69)

	AUG 69	SEP 69	OCT 69	RPT PERIOD
2nd Bn, 19th Arty	4	2	12	18*
1st Bn, 77th Arty	8	5	3	16**
1st Bn, 21st Arty	7	8	2	17
1st Bn, 30th Arty	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>13 (23)*</u>
TOTAL:	25	17	22	64

g. 2nd Bn, 20th Arty (ARA) Employment Statistics 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69

Hours Flown	6664
Sections on ARA Fire Missions	862
Sections on ARA CAPs	945
Sections as Gunships	464
Sections on Mortar Patrol	265
Aircraft on Hunter/Killer	325

\*10 moves credited to 2/19 were made by A-2/19 while under OPCON to 1/30 Arty.

\*\*NOTE: 1/77 Bn Hqs/HNB also relocated two times during this period.

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### 4. (U) Training

a. General. Formal instruction over and above normal recurring training prescribed by 1st CAV DIV Cir 350-1 consists primarily of three programs: a Forward Observer School, Counter-Sapper Training and Demonstrations .. presented to the entire division, and artillery assistance and training to ARVN artillery units .. through the DONG TIEN (Forward Together) Plan .. in support of the ARVN upgrading mission of the Division. In addition, Div Arty units liaison officers and forward observers conduct informal artillery training for the US and ARVN infantry units that they support, on a continuous basis.

b. Forward Observer School. 1st Cav Div Arty conducts formal forward observer training to newly arrived or assigned personnel who will be members of a forward observer team. The purpose of the instruction is to familiarize officers and enlisted men with the techniques of artillery adjustment in Vietnam. Two days of classroom instruction and one day of actual artillery and Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) adjustment are conducted. Seven classes were conducted during the period 1 Aug 69 - 31 Oct 69, graduating 56 students.

c. Counter-Sapper Training/Demonstrations. 1st Cav Div Arty is responsible for presenting formal counter-sapper training and sapper demonstrations to all the fire support bases and base camps within the 1st Cav TAOI. This is accomplished on a recurring basis in an attempt to reach as many personnel as possible. Each POI consists of opening remarks (10 mins) giving the background of two former sappers assigned to Div Arty as Kit Carson Scouts, that give the demonstration portion; a 15 minute class on the enemy sapper .. his background, training, and methods/techniques of attack; and a 15 minute demonstration, highlighted by the two former sappers negotiating the perimeter wire and anti-entrusion devices. This POI is also presented to each Combat Leaders Course conducted by the 1st Cav Div's First Team Academy. Following the class, the two Kit Carson Scouts are made available for questioning and to analyze the perimeter defense, as commanders may desire.

d. Artillery Assistance/Training. Division Artillery units continued an aggressive assistance program throughout the reporting period. Artillery battalions instructed supported infantry units in proper adjustment of artillery fires including ARA. The ARVN artillery forward observers and the US advisors of ARVN units received instruction in the employment of ARA from the 2nd Bn (AM), 19th Artillery in the 1st Bde AO. Division Artillery units in the 2nd and 3rd Bde AO's trained ARVN artillery units in airmobile techniques and conducted formal gunnery training for the fire direction centers of several ARVN firing units.

### 5. (U) Logistics

During the reported period the S-4 section implemented a vigorous supervision program which took representatives to the forward fire bases and base camps to evaluate and monitor, primarily, Class I, IV, and V

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stockage and resupply. Additionally, early in the period, the Division Artillery Food Service Representative began evaluating field messing facilities and operations to insure uniformity throughout the Div Arty units. Near the end of the period a command maintenance visit was initiated into the program which takes the Div Arty Maintenance Officer to the fire bases and base camps throughout the 1st Cav TAOI on a recurring basis.

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## 6. (C) Organisation

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strength as of the end of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) AUTHORIZED:	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
	*HHB	24/2	3	135/15	162/17
	**E/82	20/1	17/1	91/25	128/27
	1/21	43	2	391	436
	1/77	43	2	391	436
	2/19	43	2	391	436
	**2/20	53/3	52/3	313/156	418/162
	1/30	37	6	555	598
(2) ASSIGNED:	*HHB	31/2	17/1	89/25	116/27
	**E/82	20/1	17/1	89/25	116/27
	1/21	39	1	353	393
	1/77	42	1	348	391
	2/19	38	1	354	393
	**2/20	56/3	44/2	303/112	403/117
	1/30	36	5	518	559

NOTE: \*Figures below diagonal are the attached 273rd and 268th Radar Teams (TPS-25).

\*\*Figures below diagonal are the KD Teams attached (Aircraft Maintenance Teams).

## b. Casualties

UNIT	(AUGUST)			(SEPTEMBER)			(OCTOBER)		
	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA
2/19	1	13		1	15		1	2	(Due to lack of identity at end of period.)
1/77	3	15		6					
1/21		4		3	14		1	1	
1/30	11	40		2	18				

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b. Casualties

UNIT	(AUGUST)			(SEPTEMBER)			(OCTOBER)		
	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA
2/20	1	6		2	6				
HNB				2					
E/82	1								

c. Awards & Decorations for the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69:

UNIT	DFC	SS	LM	SM	BS"V"	BS"A"	BS"S"	AM"V"	AM	ACM"V"
HNB			1			1	11		38	1
2/19		1			46		47		63	53
1/77		2			25		63	2	47	17
1/21		3			21		89	1	114	24
1/30		4			19		50	1	25	22
2/20	6				4		48	9	106	9
E/82							4	1	6	1

UNIT	ACM"A"	ACM"S"	PH
HNB	2	27	1
2/19		16	38
1/77		47	16
1/21		65	21
1/30		124	71
2/20		58	9
E/82		11	1

7. (C) OTHER:

a. E Battery, 82nd Artillery (Aviation)

(1) Aircraft Status

(a) During the reporting period there was a large turnover

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of aircraft. F Btry turned in three (3) OH-6As and one (1) UH-1H. The replacement aircraft gained were two (2) OH-6As and two (2) additional UH-1s. These additions brought the total of UH-1s to five (5) and OH-6As to fifteen (15).

(b) Fixed wing capability was increased with the addition of three (3) U-6As and one (1) O-1D. The U-6As increased Div Arty capabilities and missions to include courier service, passenger service, and PSYOPS missions. The additional O-1G further increased the capabilities to perform better visual reconnaissance and registration duties.

(c) Aviation Safety Summary for reporting period;

Major Accidents	1
Minor Accidents	0
Incidents	5
Precautionary Landings	2

### (2) Operations

(a) During the reporting period the unit gained two additional missions: Night Hawk and Aerial Reconnaissance Team. The Night Hawk enabled the battery to acquire the fifth UH-1H aircraft (on order of the Commanding General) which has greatly reduced the possibility of ground attacks at Camp Gorvad. The Aerial Reconnaissance Team consisting of a LOH from E Btry and a Cobra (UH-1G) from B 2/20, has proved its usefulness many times in locating enemy activities in AO Chief.

(b) Each Arty Bn of Div Arty still retains two LOHs in Direct Support. This program has gone well with the exception of organizational maintenance which results in bringing the aircraft back to the E Btry location more often than desirable.

(c) The unit has attempted, in this reported period, to transition all rotary wing pilots to the LOH-6A, and the fixed wing pilots to the U-6A. This program has been very successful and will continue in the future.

### (3) Summary of Aircraft Utilization

(a) The battery flew a total of 5,525 hours during the reported period.

(b) The breakdown by the type of missions are as follows:

ADMINISTRATIVE (Including radar mens)	3700 hrs
LOGISTICS	360 hrs

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ARTILLERY ADJUSTMENT	50 hrs
COMMAND AND CONTROL	165 hrs
VISUAL RECON	850 hrs
MAINTENANCE	300 hrs
TRAINING	100 hrs

(c) During this reported period the unit flew a total of 7350 sorties averaging 45 minutes per sortie.

(4) Summary of A/C Maintenance for Reporting Period

Percentage OR - 82%

Percentage MR - 76%

b. Chaplain.

(1) During the reported period, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69, the Division Artillery Chaplain Section comprised of one Chaplain and one Chaplain's Assistant, functioned as follows:

(a) Coordinated and conducted religious coverage of all units assigned or attached to Headquarters, Division Artillery, including denominational coverage, providing a program of pastoral care and counseling. This is made possible by constant liaison with artillery commanders down to battery level and with various infantry battalion chaplains.

(b) Conducted 115 Protestant Worship Services with a total attendance of 3,218. Some of these services were area coverage services including infantry battalions operating in AO Chief.

(c) Daily visits were made to artillery units located at Camp Gorvnd, and portions of six days a week were utilized visiting the forward fire bases.

(d) Evening counseling opportunities were provided on an area coverage basis. A Wednesday evening discussion group was initiated in the early portion of the reported period and a Thursday evening group in the later portion of the same period. In mid September a chapel choir program was started, with Friday evening rehearsals. Each program has been enthusiastically accepted by men of Div Arty units in the Camp Gorvnd Base Camp.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
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(e) A total of six visits were made to hospitalized men of Div Arty units.

c. Signal: 1st Cav Division Artillery uses the following means of communications: telephone (local and long distance), radio (FM and AM), and messenger (ground and air). The communications portion of the ORLL report is divided into three parts; Artillery Communications, Base Defense Communications, and Air Warning Control Center (AWCC) Communications.

### (1) Artillery Communications:

#### (a) Telephone

1 Local Telephone, local common-user service: local service is provided by the individual units through the use of organic field switchboards, telephones, and wire. In many instances local service is augmented by base camp dial or manual switchboard service, offered by elements of the 1st Signal Brigade. In these cases the base camp cable distribution system is also operated by the 1st Signal Brigade elements and cable pairs are usually made available to interconnect tactical switchboards within the confines of the base camp.

2 Long Distance Telephone Service: long distance service is provided by tactical switchboard trunk circuits which are routed via radio relay and tropospheric scatter facilities operated by elements of the 1st Signal Brigade. Long distance service is augmented by the Army Area Telephone System, also supported by the 1st Signal Brigade elements. On occasion long distance artillery telephone services are provided by radio relay facilities organic to the Division Signal Battalion.

#### (b) Radio

1 Radio Communications (FM). The following nets provide DIV ARTY with radio communication to higher headquarters and subordinate units: DIVARTY Command Fire Net (non-secure); DIVARTY Command Fire Net (secure); and Division Intelligence Net (secure). Artillery battalions enter DIVARTY's fire net. The battalions have their own Command Fire Net and fire nets in which they communicate with their firing batteries, liaison officers, and forward observers.

2 Radio Communications (AM): DIVARTY operates as the Net Control Station of the DIVARTY RTT Net using an AN/GRC-142, while the supported battalions use AN/VSC-2s. This net is operational 24 hours a day. DIV ARTY also enters the II Field Force Artillery RTT Net when requested to do so.

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### (c) Messenger

1 Ground Messenger: A driver and  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck are on hand 24 hours daily to deliver messages within the base camp boundaries.

2 Air messenger: DIVARTY has in its assets a courier plane which makes scheduled flights to each of the forward support battalions.

### (2) Base Defense Communications:

(a) Telephones: The Command Post for base camp defense, located in the Div Arty TOC, has direct lines to each of its Sector CPs to insure prompt communication in the case of impending danger to the safety of the base camp. Each Sector CP has wire line to bunker and tower locations.

(b) Radios: The Base Defense Command Post has FM radio communication with each of the Sector CPs.

### (3) Air Warning Control Center (AWCC):

(a) Each AWCC has a sole-user voice circuit to the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) located at Tan Son Nhut. Additionally, each AWCC has access to the common-user telephone system.

(b) Radio Communications: each AWCC has a minimum of one FM radio for use in broadcasting artillery warning information to aircraft. This radio is also used to receive artillery firing data from artillery units in the area. Each AWCC also uses a VHF air/ground AM radio set for broadcasting warning data to aircraft.

### d. Medical.

(1) The overall health, sanitation, and immunization of the Division Artillery personnel during the quarter ending 31 October was good. There are three problem areas that demand attention: Malaria, Diarrhea, and Rat Bites.

(a) Malaria: A special emphasis program is under way. The program is aimed at personal protection against malaria by the use of repellent, protective clothing, mosquito netting, and supervised distribution and intake of two anti-malaria pills.

(b) Diarrhea: This problem is being attacked by education, as to the cause, common sources, and methods of prevention. Also cleanliness of all mess facilities and personnel is rigidly supervised.

(c) Rat Bites: A program to eliminate food sources and effective use of rat exterminating devices is in effect.

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(2) Other activities carried out this month include ten MEDCAP missions, in which 252 persons were treated and medical treatment given to an unknown number of nationals employed in and around the aid stations.

(3) Sanitation inspections were carried out in 15 batteries throughout the AO. The primary deficiencies were inadequate latrine facilities and improper disposal of waste.

(4) The medical facilities are well staffed. There are two Medical Officer positions vacant. There are three MOS 91A10 positions and one 91B position vacant. However, area medical coverage is available.

(5) Planned Activities: A more intensified MEDCAP program to Phuoc Vinh and the close by communities is planned. The purpose of the program is to make available proper medical treatment with good follow-up care. The aim is specifically at the control of the venereal disease rate.

### SECTION 2 (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

1. (U) Personnel. None

2. (C) Operations.

a. 105mm Howitzer Parapet Construction

Observation: The frequent moves of direct support artillery and the immediate need to provide overhead cover for personnel and ammunition, once a new position is occupied, makes it necessary to design a standard howitzer section area.

Evaluation: The parapet is designed to permit the section personnel to perform all required duties during an enemy attack while providing maximum protection for themselves, section equipment, and ammunition. The parapet is constructed primarily with dirt filled ammunition boxes and with sandbags placed on the outside of the parapet sloping from top to bottom. The parapet is approximately 3½ feet high (4 ammo boxes) and will permit direct fire by the howitzer. Ammunition bunkers are constructed on each side of the parapet and consist of two (2) pieces of 60" culvert, placed on two (2) ammo boxes filled with dirt. This structure provides storage for 80 rounds of 105 howitzer ammunition. Seven (7) ammo bunkers will house all required ammunition. Three (3) layers of sandbags are placed on the culvert and sandbags are also stacked between the culvert to provide protection from fragments and blast. Blast walls are constructed in front of the ammunition bunkers and the opening into the personnel bunkers. Four layers of dirt filled ammo boxes will

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provide blast and fragmentation protection for the personnel, equipment, and ammunition. Personnel bunkers are placed to the rear of the parapet and toward the battery center, allowing maximum clearance for direct fire 360° around the outside of all battery positions. The bunkers are constructed with ammo boxes, 72" culvert, and sandbags. The culvert is placed on 2 dirt filled ammo boxes, and arranged to form a "T". The outer ends are protected by using filled ammo boxes and sandbags. Three (3) layers of sandbags are placed on the culvert to provide overhead protection. The opening in the center of the three (3) bunkers can be covered by using excess timber or matting (PSP) from the Fire Base Kit, covered with three (3) layers of sandbags. This will provide complete cover for the section personnel during an enemy attack. Approximately 20 meters from the howitzer a collimator bunker is constructed using ammo boxes, one (1) piece of 60" culvert, and sandbags. This will protect the collimator from both fragments and weather. The parapet design on page 17 has been used by A Battery, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery since 24 May 69. During both stand-off and ground attacks it has proven very effective.

Recommendation: That this parapet design be adopted for use by Division Artillery Direct Support units.

### b. High Burst Registration:

Observation: Too great a reliance is made by the artillery in the 1st Cavalry Division on precision registration.

Evaluation: When precision registration is made without proper survey, the registration points are difficult to identify and subject to map inaccuracy. High burst registrations are particularly useful under such conditions. High terrain features or towers on adjacent Fire Support Bases provide adequate ends of a high burst base.

Recommendations: Greater emphasis should be placed on the use of high burst registrations.

### c. Check Fire of Artillery:

Observation: On many occasions, a check fire is requested by Air Warning Control Centers because aircraft are in a given area on intelligence and reconnaissance missions.

Evaluation: Aircraft that are flying intelligence and reconnaissance missions request a cease fire of artillery while the mission is being flown. There are periods of check fire that extend for 60 minutes. The aircraft is then to notify the Air Warning Control Center of their flight pattern and then leave the AWCC frequency. At the present time a contact mission is the only authority to request the aircraft to leave the vicinity of the fire mission.

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105mm How Position



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Recommendations: Aircraft flying intelligence and/or reconnaissance missions must monitor the fire control nets of the controlling artillery fire direction center or the AWCC while assigned missions are being flown. When possible, aircraft should fly in such a pattern as to avoid interfering with fire missions.

d. Marking FSB Perimeters.

Observation: During night enemy attacks on FSBs, illumination of the perimeter is usually accomplished by flares. There is no standard way used to define the perimeter when viewed from the air at night. Flares over FSBs can become a hazard to aircraft in the vicinity of the same; especially those armed aircraft providing fire support.

Evaluation: At this time it is difficult to locate the exact perimeter of a FSB from the air during the hours of darkness. By using a system of marking lights around the perimeter the exact location and physical boundaries would be very plainly displayed when viewed from the air.

Recommendations: That a standard system be established for marking of FSB perimeters and that it be accomplished with battery powered lights shielded from direct ground viewing. Different colors could be used to display certain sectors of the FSB.

e. Combined ARVN/US Operations.

Observation: Combined ARVN/US operations which involve the tactical control of a US firing battery by an ARVN artillery headquarters and/or tactical control of an ARVN firing battery by a US artillery headquarters are facilitated by close cooperation and certain techniques.

Evaluation: Combined operations of this nature present unusual problems of control, liaison, and fire direction. It has been found that the following techniques have been useful:

(a) Establishment of a joint FDC eases communications problems considerably. Exchange of information is simple and gunnery procedures can be standardized.

(b) Exchange of small liaison parties and use of bi-lingual message formats circumvents the language problem. For example, a form was devised with air advisory data in both English and Vietnamese. The ARVN personnel simply fill in blank spaces and give the form to a US RTO, who transmits the data.

Recommendations: That the above techniques be considered when combined US/ARVN operations are contemplated.

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f. Blast Walls for 155mm Howitzer Powder Bunkers

Observation: 155mm Howitzer powder bunkers without blast walls are extremely vulnerable to RPG, mortar, and rocket fire.


Evaluation: During a recent mortar and rocket standoff attack on a fire support base, a powder bunker took a direct hit with an RPG or mortar fire and exploded; causing casualties and damage to crew members and howitzer. Construction of a blast wall 2 feet high in front of the bunker, with matting or PSP for siding (supported by engineer stakes) and filled with sandbags or dirt filled 105mm ammo boxes, could greatly reduce this occurrence. The PSP serves not only as a burster plate for direct hits but also provides rigid support for the bags or boxes during high-charge firing of the 155mm howitzer.

Recommendations: That blast walls, as described above, be made a matter of SOP for all 155 howitzer units.

g. Standard 155mm Howitzer Firing Pit

Observation: Recent standoff attacks on FSBs in the 1st Cavalry Division have shown that the smaller the firing pit for a 155 howitzer, the less likely the chances are of having rocket and mortar rounds land inside these pits.

Evaluation: When a 155 howitzer section firing pit is constructed, the first step is to push up a berm approximately 5 feet high, utilizing a bulldozer. The second step is to bring in fill dirt to raise the level inside the berm (approximately 2 feet of fill) for adequate drainage.




Sufficient space must be provided inside the parapet, between the trail spades and the outer wall, to allow for the separation, storage, and protection of all 155 howitzer projectiles, powder, and fuzes. Between the ammo bunkers, located against the inside wall of the parapet, there are located 3 two-man fighting positions for the defense against ground attack of the howitzer position. The trail spade arc for the 155 howitzer measures 15 feet from pit center to the trail logs. If the inside diameter of the parapet is 50 feet across, all interior pit requirements can be met, and the minimum space required to shift trails for the howitzer would be provided. The opening in the parapet wall for moving the howitzer in and out (and for ammo resupply) need only be 15 feet wide; when not in use, a simple removable barrier, of dirt filled 105 howitzer ammo boxes, could be erected to complete the 6400 mil protection of the firing pit.

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Scale: 1" = 10'

155mm How Firing Pit

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Recommendation: That the above described 155mm howitzer firing pit be approved as standard and that the engineer support elements be advised of the requirements for the construction of the parapet walls prior to the 155 howitzer unit occupation.

### 3. (U) Training. Forward Observer Training

Observation: Forward observers must be thoroughly familiar with the proper utilization and employment of Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA).

Evaluation: FO's normally spend a day or two at battalion headquarters prior to being attached to an infantry company. This time provides an excellent opportunity for the FO to receive added instruction in the use of ARA. A 4 hour class, for all new FO's, has been developed by Div Arty units in conjunction with ARA batteries from 2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery. The purpose of the class is to advise the FO's on the proper utilization of ARA and the manner in which ARA can best be employed in support of the Infantry. The block of instruction includes a briefing by an ARA battery commander or operations officer, and an orientation flight. The orientation flight includes the expenditure of ordnance on suitable targets when the situation permits. This program has produced excellent results.

Recommendation: It is recommended that Direct Support Artillery Battalions coordinate with their General Support ARA Battery to establish an ARA orientation for all newly assigned FO's.

### 4. (C) Intelligence

#### a. Concealment of AN/MPQ-4A Radar Antenna

Observations: The enemy can observe the direction the radar is pointed and use this information in the selection of positions from which to launch a mortar attack.

Evaluation: Better utilization can be made of the MPQ-4 Radar if the enemy is unable to determine the direction of the antenna.

Recommendation: Conceal the radar screen with a parachute elevated on all sides to avoid interference with traverse, thus preventing the enemy from determining the direction of search.

#### b. Forward Observers

Observation: Forward observers are not being used to their full capabilities.

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Evaluation: Forward observers are not calling back spot reports and are not reporting all intelligence information. The observers are a vital source of intelligence information and their spot reports are a basis for fire planning. In the past observers have been calling, primarily, for fire missions. Very little surveillance was being provided after fire missions and no effort was made to keep the battalion fire direction centers informed on the type of terrain in which the observer was operating. The 1st Cav Div Arty units have re-initiated a vigorous program of intelligence gathering through the forward observer channels.

Recommendation: Liaison officers must require the forward observers to provide spot reports on a continuous basis. In addition, much useful information and greater rapport is established by debriefing of the forward observers by the Battalion S-3, S-2, and/or their assistants.

5. (U) Organization: None

6. (S) Communications.

a. Field Expedient Antennas

Observation: Antenna assembly RC-292 is particularly vulnerable to damage and/or destruction by incoming rounds at forward fire support bases. Availability of replacements for combat loss antennas is limited and time consuming.

Evaluation: It has been found that field expedient FM radio antennas can be constructed very easily with materials already on hand at the fire support base. Several of these expedient antennas can be prepared as backup for existing RC-292s. Battalions within Div Arty have constructed over 15 of these expedient antennas. The specific type found to be most efficient is a vertically polarized, center-fed, half-wave antenna. Solid copper wire of approximately 6 gauge is used as the basic antenna, although field wire is satisfactory. Insulators can be made of wood or fiberboard sections from inside an unserviceable GA-386/PRC-25 battery. Field wire or RF cable may be used as the Transmission Line, but both must be fitted with a coaxial fitting to match the antenna receptacle on the radio. This can be done by adapting a UG-255 coaxial fitting with alligator clips or any method to match one strand of the field wire to the ground lead, and the other strand to the RF lead. Units have made use of these expedients by using them as main antennas in rear areas, as backup at the battalion operations location, and as emergency backup on FSBs. They have also served as a primary antenna during split battery operations.

Recommendation: That field expedient FM antennas be used to replace RC-292 in fixed or semi-fixed locations and as reserve systems in all forward locations.

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### b. Communications During Split Commitments

Observation: During tactical operations where firing batteries were split for extended periods of time, the communications commitment was essentially doubled.

Evaluation: For short operations of a split firing battery, the additional communications equipment necessary is available from the organic battery. However, when batteries are split for extended periods and occupy separate fire support bases the following minimum configuration is required for a battery:

- (a) 2 ea RC-292 or equivalent field expedient antennas
- (b) 1 ea AN/VRC-46 FM Radio
- (c) 1 ea AN/PRC-25 FM Radio
- (d) 1 ea 1.5 KW 28 volt DC generator.
- (e) 4 ea TA-312 field telephones
- (f) 2 ea 12 volt DC storage batteries

In addition, if the liaison section associated with the battery is similarly split the following minimum configuration is required for each location:

- (a) 2 ea RC-292 or equivalent field expedient antennas
- (b) 1 ea AN/VRC-46 FM Radio
- (c) 1 ea AN/PRC-25 FM Radio

(Here it is assumed that power will be provided by the Infantry.)

The TOE of the 105 howitzer battery provides the organic equipment to carry on sustained operations in a split configuration, with the exception of the communications portion of the mission, however. Reserve or backup equipment must be put in service and maintenance becomes critical. The TOE of the liaison section does not provide backup equipment for a split capability. Consequently the liaison sections must depend upon the already depleted reserve equipment of the firing battery.

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
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1969

Recommendations: That communications contingency plans be effected to fully utilize the organic equipment available at battalion level should one or more of the firing batteries be required to operate for sustained periods in a split configuration. Also, kits of anticipated communications supplies should be maintained at battalion level to rapidly supply the displacing battery with essential supplies. Such kits should include antenna parts, DR-8 wire reels, TL wire cutters, assorted power and electrical cable, DC storage batteries with clamps, electrical tape, BA-30s, BA-286/PRC-25, a few spare handsets, and the necessary additional SOI items and operational codes.

3 Incl

as

Incl 2 wd HQ, DA

  
MORRIS L. BRADY  
LTC, Field Artillery  
Commanding

**DISTRIBUTION:**

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File	2

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AVDAGT-DT (3 November 1969) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM)  
for the Period Ending, 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), APO San Francisco 96490, 14 Nov 69

TO: Commanding General  
1st FORG IV  
ATTN: G-3 R&I  
10 00266

1. This Headquarters has received the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery and concurs with the report.

2. Report is forwarded in compliance with USARV Reg. 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Kenneth R. Swaim*  
KENNETH R. SWAIM  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

AVFBC-RE-H (3 Nov 69) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R2)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 23 DEC 1969


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for the period  
ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
B. G. MACDONALD  
ILT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (3 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 20 J.

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:


a. (U) Reference item concerning "105mm Howitzer Parapet Construction", page 15, paragraph 2a; concur. Recommend this item be forwarded to the US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma for evaluation. This item will be considered for inclusion in USARV's publication "Battlefield Report - Tips for Commanders".

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Marking FSB Perimeters", page 18, paragraph 2d; concur. The distress light marker (FSN 6230-067-5209) is a battery powered device which is authorized by current TOE and can be used for this purpose. Additionally, a flash guard w/blue filter (FSN 6230-917-6692) will shield it from direct ground viewing. Standard issue flashlights are also suitable. No action by USARPAC or DA is required.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Standard 155mm Howitzer Firing Pit", page 19, paragraph 2g; concur. Recommend this item be forwarded to the US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma for evaluation.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Concealment of AN/MPQ-4A Radar Antenna", page 20, paragraph 4a; concur. Nylon parachute canopy, standard Army issue camouflage netting or canvas may be used to camouflage the direction of scan of the counter-mortar radar antenna. However, an accumulation of dirt or debris on the camouflage material may attenuate the radar returns and, thereby, reduce the sensitivity of the set. ECOM Laboratories at Fort Monmouth are presently conducting a test of this technique.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
L. D. LAUREY  
CPT, AFSC

Cy Funn:  
1st Cav Div Arty (AM)  
II FFORCEV

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10



GPOP-DT (3 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile)  
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. I. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1969

Field Artillery Organization for Combat as of 31 October 1969:

1. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery

2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery (105): DS 1st Bde

B 2/19

C 2/19

A 1/77 OPCON

1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (105): DS 2nd Bde

A 1/21 OPCON

C 1/77

1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (105): DS 3rd Bde

B 1/21

C 1/21

B 1/77 OPCON

1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155): GS 1st Cav Div Arty and control  
the fires of the DS Artillery  
Battery in Div Arty's AO Chief

A 1/30: GSR 2nd Bn, 19th Arty

B 1/30: GSR 1st Bn, 77th Arty

C 1/30: GSR 1st Bn, 21st Arty

A 2/19: OPCON

2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA): GS 1st Cav Div Arty

A 2/20: GSR (Modified) 2nd Bn, 19th Arty

B 2/20: GSR (Modified) 1st Bn, 77th Arty

C 2/20: GSR (Modified) 1st Bn, 21st Arty

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Batter. F, 82nd Artillery (Aviation): GS 1st Cav Div Arty

Attachments:

3rd Plt , Btry C, 4th Bn, 60th Arty (AW) (SP): GS 1st Cav Div  
Arty

Btry E, 8th Bn, 6th Arty (4.2" Mortar): GS 1st Cav Div Arty

2. Supporting Artillery

II FFV Artillery

6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8"/175): GS II FFV and control  
the fires of DS Arti-  
llery of the 11th ACR

1st Howitzer Battery, 11th ACR (155 SP): OPCON

2nd Howitzer Battery, 11th ACR (155 SP): OPCON

3rd Howitzer Battery, 11th ACR (155 SP): OPCON

Btry C, 2nd Bn, 12th Arty (155): GSR 1st Cav Div Arty

Btry C, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105): GSR 1st Cav Div Arty

Btry F, 16th FA Arty Bn (155): GS II FFV

Btry A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery (8"/175mm): GS II FFV

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COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPLE STAFF, 1ST CAV DIV ARTY AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969

### HEADQUARTERS DIVISION ARTILLERY:

CO:	LTC Morris L. Brady
XO:	LTC Howard D. Guiley
FSCG:	LTC Dwight L. Wilson
S-1:	MAJ James S. Williams
S-2:	CPT Gerald W. Sharpe
S-3:	LTC Thomas J. P. Jones
S-4:	MAJ David B. Smith
S-5:	CPT Fred P. Swiss
CO, HHB:	CPT Charles W. Stewart

### 2ND BN, 19TH ARTY (105):

CO:	LTC Leo J. Fitzgerald
XO:	MAJ Robert E. Blake
S-1:	CPT Ronald R. Goodell
S-2:	CPT Robert P. Williams
S-3:	MAJ Fredrick J. McConville
S-4:	1LT John L. Keith
CO, HHB:	CPT Joseph A. Krupansky
CO, A BTRY:	CPT Theodore A. Monette
CO, B BTRY:	CPT Mac K. Hennigan
CO, C BTRY:	CPT John P. Purcell

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### 1ST BN, 77TH ARTY (105):

CO: LTC William J. Harrison  
XO: MAJ Robert P. Cairns  
S-1: LT Robert L. Bernhart Jr.  
S-2: CPT Roger W. Minnicar  
S-3: MAJ Stephen A. Glick  
S-4: CPT George D. Shannon  
CO, HHD: CPT Gene A. Williams  
CO, A BTRY: CPT Roy S. Carlson  
CO, B BTRY: CPT Edward J. Dewey  
CO, C BTRY: CPT William G. O'Dell

### 1ST BN, 21ST ARTY (105):

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XO: MAJ James H. Ramsden  
S-1: CPT Richard M. Swain  
S-2: CPT Louis G. Alaman  
S-3: MAJ Charles W. Jarvis  
S-4: CPT John Patterson  
CO, HHD: CPT Raymond E. Whitney  
CO, A BTRY: CPT Kenneth R. Carlson  
CO, B BTRY: CPT John M. Harnisch  
CO, C BTRY: CPT Roger L. Segler

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S-1: MAJ Gerald Chapman, Jr.  
S-2: CPT John R. Henry  
S-3: CPT Terry L. Maris  
S-4: MAJ Jack T. Garven  
CO, HNB: CPT Raymond G. Beck  
CO, SVC BTRY: CPT Ronald O. Pruitt  
CO, 1 BTRY: CPT William L. Noard  
CO, 2 BTRY: CPT James Carmona  
CO, 3 BTRY: CPT Urey W. Alexander  
CO, 4 BTRY: CPT Josue Robles, Jr.

### 2ND BN, 20TH ARTY (ARA):

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S-1: MAJ Edwin K. Robinson  
S-2: CPT John G. Christie  
S-3: CPT Gary E. Epperson  
S-4: MAJ August M. Cianciolo  
CO, HNB: CPT George Cortez  
CO, A BTRY: CPT Jan C. Polliard  
CO, B BTRY: MAJ Walter J. Wosicki  
CO, C BTRY: MAJ Donald C. Wilson  
CO, D BTRY: MAJ Donald E. Wilson

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BTRY E, 82ND ARTY (aviation):

CO: MAJ Joseph S. Davis

XO: CPT Edil S. Hunek

OPNS OFF: CPT David M. Snyder

3RD PLT , BTRY C, 4TH BN, 60TH ARTY (AW) (SP):

DET CO: CPT Michael L. Mulhern

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